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Abstract 
 
This study assesses the comparative economics of governance in fighting terrorism in 53 
African countries for period 1996-2012. Four terrorism variables are used, namely: domestic, 
transnational, unclear and total terrorism dynamics. Nine bundled and unbundled governance 
variables are employed, notably: political stability/no violence, voice & accountability, 
political governance, government effectiveness, regulation quality, economic governance, 
corruption-control, the rule of law and institutional governance. The empirical evidence is 
based on Fixed Effects regressions. In the analytical procedure, we first bundle governance 
indicators by means of principal component analysis before engaging the empirical exercise 
with the full sample. In the final step, specifications are based on a decomposed full sample in 
order to articulate the fundamental characteristics for comparative purposes. The following 
broad findings are established. First, good governance is an appealing tool in fighting 
terrorism. Second, the relevance of the good governance dynamics is as follows in order of 
increasing relevance: economic governance, institutional governance and political 
governance. The findings are presented in increasing order of magnitude to emphasise 
fundamental features in which governance dynamics have the highest effect in mitigating 
terrorism.   
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1. Introduction 
 The motivation for this inquiry is fourfold: (i) increasing challenges of terrorism to 
Africa’s development; (ii) ongoing debates surrounding the role of governance in mitigating 
terrorism; (iii) paradigm shifts in the conception and definition of governance and (iv) 
shortcomings in the literature. The four highlighted points are engaged chronologically. 
 According to Alfa-Wali et al. (2015), trauma from terrorism is increasingly a policy 
challenge in Africa. According to the authors, while terrorism is not an entirely new 
phenomenon in Africa, the scale and magnitude with which it has increased over the past 
years is substantial. The authors are consistent with the position that several factors contribute 
toward providing an enabling environment for the growth of terrorism on the continent, 
notably: religious fundamentalism; tribal and ethnic tensions and increasing political 
instability at regional levels (Fazel, 2013). Clavarino (2014) concurs with this narrative in the 
perspective that compared to other regions of the world, in spite of Africa currently 
experiencing surges in waves of radicalisation from Islamic extremism; the continent is not 
being given the policy attention it deserves because most of the focus has been on the Middle 
East. Some notable terrorist organisations that are burgeoning across the continent include: al-
Shabab in Somalia; Boko Haram in Nigeria and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. 
 The literature on the terrorism-governance nexus is clouded with a lot of controversy 
(Lee, 2013; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017a).  The first strand contends that good institutions2 
are not useful in reducing terrorism because the interests of terrorists’ organizations may not 
be represented by democratic government institutions (Gause, 2005). According to the strand, 
terrorism can be entertained in societies characterized with comparatively good governance 
standards because of a number of factors that are directly or indirectly linked to grievances 
and enabling conditions for terrorism activities, namely: civil liberties, freedom and access to 
media and freedom of speech with which dissatisfaction and disagreement can be expressed 
(Ross, 1993). The strand of the literature concurs with more contemporary narratives 
sympathetic to the perspective that exclusive socio-economic development in advanced 
democracies with good governance motivates terrorism activities (Bass, 2014). A case in 
point according to Foster (2014) is second-generation Western-educated youths from Europe 
joining the ranks of the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) because they feel treated like 
foreigners in their countries. However, a second strand argues that fundamental characteristics 
                                                 
2
 Throughout the study, this term ‘governance’ is used interchangeably with ‘institutions’. It should be noted that 
the former concept is distinct from ‘institutional governance’ which is denoted by the rule of law and corruption-
control (see Asongu, 2016a).   
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of good institutions can mitigate negative sentiments towards the state and therefore, reduce 
the likelihood of terrorist entities recruiting Islamic fundamentalists (see Windsor, 2003; Li, 
2005).  
Recent literature on the quality of institutions in Africa has witnessed two major 
improvements in the conception and measurement of governance. On the conception front, 
the paradigm shift is motivated by the two principal models of development for Africa in the 
contemporary era, namely: the Beijing model that prioritises economic governance (or 
economic rights) versus the Washington consensus that places more emphasis on political 
governance (or political rights) (Asongu, 2016b; Asongu & Ssozi, 2016).  The corresponding 
literature provides insights into which governance priorities are needed in the short- and long-
run to address African development challenges. On the measurement front, it is difficult to 
measure some of the conceptions of governance underlying the Washington consensus and 
the Beijing model without an initial bundling of institutions for more representative and/or 
composite indicators.  For example, priorities of the Beijing model and Washington consensus 
which are respectively economic governance and political governance cannot be measured 
without bundling some constituent indicators, namely: regulation quality and government 
effectiveness for economic governance and voice & accountability and political stability for 
political governance. The above paradigm shifts in the conception and measurement of 
institutions is motivating a growing stream of literature on the comparative African 
economics of governance for development outcomes, inter alia: (i) most relevant governance 
mechanisms in stimulating innovation (Oluwatobi et al., 2015) and (ii) negative government 
signals of the Arab Spring (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a).  
The literature on relevant instruments by which conflicts could be mitigated and 
terrorism fought, has proposed a number of interesting channels. On the one hand, more 
general mechanisms include: press freedom and publicity (Hoffman et al., 2013); military 
tools (Feridun & Shahbaz, 2010); understanding of attitudes towards terrorism (Gardner, 
2007); dynamics of transparency (Bell et al., 2014) and education/bilingualism (Costa et al., 
2008; Brockhoff et al., 2015). On the other hand, African-specific studies have been oriented 
towards exploring and examining: the role of the African Union in the fight against terrorism 
(Ewi & Aning, 2006); the absence of freedoms and presence of poverty (Barros et al., 2008); 
geopolitical fluctuations (Straus, 2012) and how competition by military companies affect the 
rate at which conflicts are terminated (Akcinaroglu  & Radziszewski,  2013).  
With respect to the role of governance in mitigating terrorism, emphasis has either 
been skewed towards the influence of democratic institutions (Savun & Phillips, 2009; Lee, 
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2013) or focused on specific institutional dimensions like transparency (Bell et al., 2014) and 
the rule of law (Choi, 2010).   
Noticeably, the engaged literature leaves room for improvement in two key areas, the 
need for a: comprehensive assessment of the role of governance in fighting terrorism and the 
comparative emphasis on fundamental characteristics of African development. The former 
contribution builds on the need to provide a holistic assessment with nine governance 
indicators while the latter contribution is motivated by the relevance of providing more room 
for policy implications through the conditioning of findings on specific-fundamentals. The 
governance variables are: institutional governance (corruption-control and the rule of law); 
economic governance (government effectiveness and regulation quality); and political 
governance (political stability/no violence and voice & accountability). The adopted 
fundamental characteristics are: legal origin (English common law versus vs. French civil 
law), political stability (conflict-affected vs. politically stable), resource-wealth (resource-rich 
vs. resource-poor), income levels (low- vs. middle-income), regional proximity (Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) vs. North Africa), openness to sea (landlocked vs. coastal) and religious 
domination (Islam vs. Christianity).  
The relevance of governance in development outcomes is important for many reasons, 
namely: amelioration of standards of living through better allocation of resources (Anyanwu 
& Erhijakpor, 2014; Fosu, 2013), especially for the elderly that are deprived (Fonchingong 
2014); understanding governance quality attributes (Efobi, 2015); dynamics of governance by 
participation (Waheduzzaman & As-Saber,  2015) and good governance for inclusive 
develoment (Fosu, 2015).  
In the light of the above, the research question asked in this  study is the following: 
how does governance  affect terrorism in Africa when comparative fundamentals of  legal 
origins, political stability, resource-wealth, income levels, regional proximity, openness to sea 
and religious domination are taken into account? To answer this  question, the study focuses 
on 53 African countries for the period 1996-2012. Terrorism is understood from four main 
perspectives, namely, domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism dynamics. Nine 
bundled and unbundled governance variables are employed, notably: political stability/no 
violence, voice & accountability, political governance, government effectiveness, regulation 
quality, economic governance, corruption-control, the rule of law and institutional 
governance. The empirical evidence is based on Fixed Effects regressions. In the analytical 
procedure, we first bundle governance indicators by means of principal component analysis 
before engaging the empirical exercise with the full sample. In the final step, specifications 
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are based on a decomposed full sample in order to articulate the fundamental characteristics 
for comparative purposes. The following broad findings are established. First, good 
governance is an appealing tool in fighting terrorism. Second, the relevance of the good 
governance dynamics is as follows in order of increasing relevance: economic governance, 
institutional governance and political governance. The findings are presented in increasing 
order of magnitude to emphasise fundamental features in which governance dynamics have 
the highest effect in mitigating terrorism.   
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The theoretical underpinnings are 
covered in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the data and methodology. The empirical analysis, 
discussion of results and implications are engaged in Section 4. Section 5 concludes with 
future research directions.  
 
2. Stylized facts and  theoretical underpinnings  
2.1 Stylized facts 
There are a number of interesting stylized facts linking the nexus between the quality 
institutions and terrorism on the African continent.  Terrorism is defined in this study as the 
actual and threatened use of force by subnational actors with the purpose of employing 
intimidation to meet political objectives (Enders & Sandler, 2006).  Poor institutions in Africa 
are substantially contributing to providing a fertile ground for the development of terrorism 
and extremism on the continent (Clavarino, 2014). Terrorists’ organisations in Africa are 
growing in scale and scope because of a plethora of inherent weakenesses that Islamic 
fundamentalists (for the most part) can leverage upon, namely: prosperous drug trade from 
which profits are reinvested in the financing of terrorism; porous borders and 
undertrained/underequipped armies and vulnerable/corrupt central governments. Clavarino 
posits that since the collapse of the Muammar Gaddafi’s Libyan regime in 2011, Islamic 
insurgency and militancy have been on a sharply increasing curve in the Sahel region. 
Moreover, the 2013 French-led intervention in the Western African nation of Mali has 
contributed to scattering Islamic fondamentalists across the continent. In other parts of Africa, 
the rise of Islamist militancy is traceable to poor governance for the most part. We put this 
nexus between poor governance and terrorism into more perspective. The Boko Haram is 
flurishing in North Eastern Nigeria and neighbouring countries particularly in areas where 
government presence is weak. For example according to Asongu and Biekpe (2018), the Boko 
Haram of Nigeria represented the deadliest terrorist organisation in 2014, with about 6,644 
deaths, relative to the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) which accounted for about 6,073 
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deaths during the same year. The prosperity of Al-Shabaab in East Africa has been traceable 
to decades of a failed Somali central government. With regard to North Africa,  terrorist 
organisations have grown for the most part in failed states like Libya and areas of weak 
government influence in other nation states. These include: Ansar Al-Shariya in Tunisia and 
Ansar Dine, led by a former close Gaddafi ally Iyad Ag Ghaly; Al-Qaeda-linked 
Mulathameen Brigade led by the Algerian Mokhtar Belmokhtar and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM).  
 According to Solomon (2017), over the past five years, approximately 20, 000 people 
have been killed across Africa by two notable terrorist groups which have accounted for about 
71% (91%) of terrorism incidents (fatalities). The author maintains that the number of 
terrorism-related deaths reached its peak in 2015 when the Boko Haram massacred more than 
8,000 people in Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Nigeria. The Boko Haram has inflicted more 
destruction and death than any other terrorism movement in Africa over the past 20 years, 
accounting for about one-third of the total deaths. However, in 2015, terrorism-related deaths 
dropped since that attacks peaked in 2012, not exclusively because of the Boko Haram but 
also because militant movements from Al-Qaida in the North Africa with allied groups took 
control of the North of the continent. Terrorism incidence peaked in 2012 because according 
to the narrative, since 2013, about 17 African countries have not experienced a terrorist attack 
while 23 have not witnessed terrorism-related deaths. The sample of this research ends in 
2012 (partly due to data availability constraints, partly due to the drop in terrorism incidences) 
and all African countries for which data is available are considered in this research because 
Solomon (2017) concludes that “There is not a single country which is unaffected by this, 
including my own.” 
 The relationships between terrorism and governance are provided in the figures below, 
notably: Figure 1, Figure 2 and Figure 3 respectively depict the connections between 
governance dynamics and domestic terrorism, transnational terrorism and unclear terrorism. 
When the figures are observed from vertical and horizontal perspectives, there are consistent 
negative nexuses between terrorism and governance. Whereas these figures inform the study 
on the expected sign of the relationships being investigated, the study cannot rely exclusively 
on the graphs for two main reasons. On the one hand, it is worthwhile to assess whether the 
established graphical nexuses withstand empirical validity. On the other hand, a comparative 
empirical analysis with fundamental characteristics is also necessary in order to answer the 
research question motivating the study.  
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Figure 1: Domestic terrorism (Domter) and governance  
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Figure 2: Transnational terrorism (Transter) and governance  
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Figure 3: Unclear terrorism (Unter) and governance  
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2.2 Theoretical underpinnings  
 Theories and intuitions underlying the investigated linkages can be discussed in three 
principal categories: (i) the nexus between domestic terrorism and governance; (ii) the 
relationship between transnational terrorism and governance and (iii) debates surrounding the 
nexus between governance and terrorism. Foundations on the linkage between domestic 
terrorism and governance are consolidated by the view that citizens in countries have 
incentives to resort to radical means and political violence against the government (or other 
institutions), other citizens and political figures (Choi, 2010). Three scenarios under which 
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they recourse to violence are when: (i) there are grievances on the part of citizens; (ii) there is 
growing hopelessness and desperation and no peaceful mechanisms by which such grievances 
can be settled and (iii) citizens think that resorting to terror tactics is legitimate and viable in 
the communication of their anger and frustration. The logic behind this underpinning is that as 
long as citizens are endowed with peaceful mechanisms for resolving conflicts, terrorism 
options may not be practically considered in the resolution of conflicts and settlement of 
socio-political scores. This narrative is consistent with Taydas et al. (2010) who have argued 
that “…states characterised with high institutional quality are less likely to experience civil 
war” (p. 195). We postulate within this framework that compared to nations with weak 
governance structures, countries that enjoy comparatively better governance standards are 
very likely to offer peaceful mechanisms for the settlement of conflicts. This postulation is on 
the basis that good governance does not offer an appropriate environment for the growth of 
terror networks because peaceful mechanisms by which to express grievances are available to 
ordinary citizens.  
 Transnational terrorism is connected with governance in the perspective that good 
institutions strengthen the legitimacy of democratic systems in place with shields that protect 
both citizens and foreigners on the one hand and on the other hand, provide nonviolent 
channels by which disputes can be resolved (Choi, 2010). Hence, it is very likely that 
transnational terrorism is curbed by the following good governance dynamics: (i) political 
governance, which offers fair and free domestic means for the replacement and election of 
political leaders; (ii) economic governance, which enables the formulation and 
implementation of good measures that provide the citizens with public goods and services and 
(iii) institutional governance, that oversees the respect by the State and citizens of institutions 
that governance interactions between them. The definitions of governance are consistent with 
Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016a).  
 The theoretical literature has conflicting positions on the nexus between terrorism and 
governance. Studies focusing on the relationship predominantly build on the scholarship that 
emphasizes opportunities of violence that are exploited from regime-based differences 
(democracy versus autocratic) (Hoffman et al., 2013). While autocracies are characterized 
with bad governance, democracies endow citizens with liberties to engage economically and 
politically without substantial interferences from governments. Externalities from good 
governance are not exclusively positive because some downsides like avenues of mischief 
may move hand-in-glove with democratic processes. In substance, contrary to stable 
autocracies, countries that are characterized with strong democracies could very easily be the 
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focus of and target by terrorists entities because violence is curtailed ex-ante and not ex-post 
by good governance. The articulation on stable democracies is motivated by the perspective 
that failed or failing states cannot easily control terrorism. More insights into this position is 
available in Lai (2007) and Piazza (2008a). The stance has also been confirmed in a broad 
stream of terrorism literature (Schmid, 1992; Eubank & Weinberg, 1994; Drakos & Gofas, 
2006; Piazza, 2007; Asongu & Amankwah-Amoah, 2018). 
Conversely, a strand of the theoretical literature is more optimistic on the relationship 
between good governance and terrorism. For instance, the political access theory (Eyerman, 
1998) postulates that countries enjoying strong democracies and comparatively good 
governance standards are more likely to be immune from terrorism compared to their 
counterparts with poor democracies and governance. Some of the documented government 
institutions’ facilities that contribute toward this advantage in the negative governance-
terrorism nexus include: respect of the rule of law (Choi, 2010); independence of judiciaries 
(Findley & Young, 2011) and the six governance dynamics from Kaufmann et al. (2010). In 
the light of the above, it is reasonable to infer that good governance provides citizens with 
avenues of and channels by which grievances from citizens can be settled pacifically without 
resorting to violence and terrorism (Li, 2005).  
 On the empirical front, there is a wealth of literature documenting the positive 
relationship between democracy and terrorism (see Lee, 2013). More specific literature on the 
nexus between transnational terrorism and democracy include: Eubank and Weinberg (1994, 
2001); Weinberg and Eubank (1998) and Piazza (2007, 2008b). Terrorism can be stimulated 
by domestic competition in environments of good governance (Chenoweth, 2010). There are 
two main competing impacts from democratic institutions on terrorism (Li, 2005). On the one 
hand, democracy by participation reduces the likelihood for transnational terrorism. On the 
other hand, due to political deadlock in checks and balances, constraints in government 
structures and procedures can grease transnational terrorism.  
According to Savun and Phillips (2009), the responsiveness of terrorism to foreign 
policy is higher than its responsiveness to democratic institutions. In essence, the foreign 
policy alignment of a country can significantly determine if the country is victim of 
transnational terrorism organisations, irrespective of prevailing democratic institutions in the 
country. According to the authors, nations that shy away from international policies are less 
likely to be targeted by transnational terrorism. This is not the case of countries that are 
actively engaged in international politics because the foreign policy position adopted by a 
country can fuel resentment abroad. In summary, irrespective of regime types per se, 
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countries with mature democratic and governance institutions can still be the object of attacks 
by terrorists’ networks if their foreign policy towards countries hosting corresponding terrorist 
organisations fuels resentment.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data and fundamental characteristics  
3.1.1 Data 
 The study assesses a panel of 53 African countries with data for the period 1996-2012. 
The data is from three principal sources, namely: (i) African Development Indicators (ADI) 
and World Governance Indicators from the World Bank; (ii) the Global Terrorism Database 
and (iii) an improved computation of terrorism incidents from Enders et al. (2011) and 
Gailbulloev et al. (2012). The adopted periodicity is because of data availability constraints. 
Three points elicit these constraints. The computed terrorism incidents from Enders et al. 
(2011) and Gailbulloev et al. (2012) are only available up to the year 2012. Macroeconomic 
indicators from the ADI of the World Bank are also only available until 2012. The periodicity 
starts from 1996 because good governance indicators from the World Bank are not available 
before 1996. 
 Accordingly, whereas the full periodicity is 1996-2012, two distinctive features are 
apparent: (i) annual periodicity instead of data averages (or non-overlapping intervals) is 
employed because the empirical strategy is based on Fixed Effects (FE) estimators which 
require that the time series properties (T) are large and (ii) the comparative emphasis on 
governance is based on fundamental characteristics. The resulting T=17 (1996-2012) is 
therefore based on data availability constraints at the time of the study. This departs from 
Asongu et al. (2018a) who have used the Generalised Method of Moments and five three-year 
non-overlapping intervals (1998-2000; 2001-2003; 2004-2006; 2007-2009 and 2010-2012) in 
order to avoid misspecification owing to instrument proliferation.  
 The study uses four different but related terrorism dependent indicators, namely: 
domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism dynamics. The dependent indicator is a 
record of yearly terrorism incidents experienced by a country. In order to correct for the 
positive skew in the data and avoid mathematical concerns about log-transforming zeros, the 
study is in accordance with the literature (Choi & Salehyan, 2013; Bandyopadhyay et al., 
2014; Efobi & Asongu, 2016; Asongu et al., 2017; Asongu & Biekpe, 2018) in adding one to 
the base and taking the natural logarithm of terrorism incidents.  
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Terrorism is defined in this study as the actual and threatened use of force by 
subnational actors with the purpose of employing intimidation to meet political objectives 
(Enders & Sandler, 2006; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b). Terrorism-specific definitions are 
from Efobi et al. (2015, p. 6). Domestic terrorism “includes all incidences of terrorist 
activities that involves the nationals of the venue country: implying that the perpetrators, the 
victims, the targets and supporters are all from the venue country” (p.6). Transnational 
terrorism is “terrorism including those acts of terrorism that concerns at least two countries. 
This implies that the perpetrator, supporters and incidence may be from/in one country, but 
the victim and target is from another”.  Unclear terrorism is that, “which constitutes 
incidences of terrorism that can neither be defined as domestic nor transnational terrorism” 
(p.6). Total terrorism is the sum of domestic, transnational and unclear terrorisms.  
 The explaining indicators are nine bundled and unbundled governance variables:  
corruption-control,  the rule of law,  government effectiveness, regulation quality, political 
stability, voice and accountability, institutional governance, economic govenance and political 
governance.  While the first-six unbundled governance variables are from Kaufmann et al. 
(2010), the last-three bundled indicators are derived from a statistical technique or Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) which is engaged in Section 3.2.1. As observed in the previous 
sections, these governance variables are consistently being used in an evolving stream of good 
governance literature (Gani, 2011; Yerrabit & Hawkes, 2015).  
 To ascertain that results are not biased by concerns about omitted variables, the study 
uses five control variables, namely: inclusive development, internet penetration, inflation, 
economic growth (GDP growth) and military expenditure. First, exclusive development has 
been established to be positively associated with adherence to and sympathy for terrorists’ 
organisations (see Bass, 2014). An eloquent example is the case of Western-born and -
educated youth joining ISIL (Foster, 2014). Furthermore, Tonwe and Eke (2013) maintain 
that the fundamental cause of Nigeria’s Boko Haram is traceable to the fact that the Northern 
region of the country is less developed compared to the Southern region. We employ the 
inequality adjusted human development index (IHDI) as a proxy for inclusive development 
because of constraints in data availability (e.g. the Gini index for inequality).  This narrative is 
consistent with the position that economic hardship on the poor increases their level of 
grievance and makes them more likely to be sympathetic to or engage in international 
terrorism (Choi & Luo, 2013).   Second, Argomaniz (2015) and Holbrook (2015) have 
established that the internet is increasingly being used by terrorists’ organisations like ISIL for 
recruitment, propaganda and coordination of terrorists’ attacks.   
14 
 
 Third, we expect very high inflation to be associated with violence and political strife 
because of inter alia: decreasing purchasing power and diminishing domestic investment due 
to a negative economic outlook (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a). Fourth, economic prosperity 
is anticipated to reduce the likelihood for terrorists’ activities because it is associated with an 
improvement in the much needed financial resources for fighting the scourge. The intuition 
for this expectation aligns with Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009) who have maintained that 
compared with low-income countries, nations with high-income can better absorb the effects 
of terrorism without significant negative economic externalities. It also important to balance 
this narrative with recent evidence that: “economic growth is not a cure-all solution for 
terrorism because it may be associated in some instances with more terrorist incidents” 
(Choi, 2015, p. 157). Fifth, as documented by Feridum and Shahbaz (2010), military 
expenditure is expected to be negatively linked to terrorism.  
The definitions of variable are provided in Appendix 1, whereas the summary statistics 
and correlation matrix are disclosed in Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 respectively. It can be 
observed from the summary statistics that the means of variables are comparable. 
Corresponding variations from the standard deviations is an indication that we can be 
confident that reasonable estimated linkages would emerge. The objective of the correlation 
matrix is to control for issues in multicollinearity. An initial assessment shows that concerns 
about high degrees of substitution are exclusively apparent among governance indicators on 
the one hand and terrorism variables on the other hand. While the study addresses the concern 
about multicollinearity in governance indicators by using them in different specifications, the 
issues in terrorism indicators is not relevant because these are exclusively employed as 
dependent variables.  
 
3.1.2 Determination of fundamental characteristics  
  
The choice of the fundamental characteristics which have been empirically and theoretically 
justified in extant comparative African development literature (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 
2017b)3 are also consistent with recent literature on fighting terrorism in Africa (Asongu et 
al., 2018b). They include: legal origins (French civil law vs. English common law), political 
stability (politically-stable vs. conflict-affected), resource-wealth (resource-poor vs. resource-
                                                 
3
 These fundamental features are consistent with a strand of comparative African development literature Asongu 
(2013, 2014a,b, 2017a,b).  
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rich), income levels (middle-income vs. low-income), regional proximity (North Africa vs. 
SSA), openness to sea (coastal vs. landlocked) and religious domination (Christianity vs. 
Islam).  
 First, the foundations of legal origin as a distinguishing characteristic in African 
countries has considerably been documented in the literature over the past decades, notably 
with respect to comparative advantages in: (i) education, economic growth and openness 
(Agbor, 2015); (ii) adaptation to changing and growing economic conditions (Beck et al., 
2003) and (iii) quality of institutions (La Porta et al., 1998, 1999). The institutional edge 
enjoyed by English common law countries over French civil law nations which has been 
theorized by La Porta et al. (1998, 1999) and Beck et al. (2003), has been confirmed to 
withstand empirical scrutiny in recent African development literature (Asongu, 2012a,b; 
Agbor, 2015). In a nutshell, the intuition motivating the classification is that the institutional 
web of formal norms, informal rules and enforcement features within a legal system has some 
bearing on how terrorism is fought by means of government quality and institutional regimes 
(Li, 2005; Choi, 2010; Lee, 2013).  Classification of countries in terms of legal origins builds 
on information from La Porta et al. (2008, p. 289). 
 Second, in the categorization of countries in relation to conflicts and political strife, 
there are obviously practical issues with regard to assigning a country to this category in an 
exclusive and non-arbitrary manner. Accordingly, it is important to distinguish the countries 
by articulating the periodicity and significance of political strife and instability because it is 
not obvious for a country to be completely conflict-free. With these insights, two groups can 
be substantiated in terms “civil war” and “political strife”. (i) The group on civil war entails: 
Somalia; Sudan; Sierra Leone; Liberia; Côte d’Ivoire (1999 coup d’état, 2002-2007 civil war, 
rekindled in 2011); the Democratic Republic of Congo; the Central African Republic (with 
the 2004-2007 Bush War and waves of aborted coup d’états between 1996-2003); Chad 
(2005-2010); Burundi and Angola. (ii) Concerning the second group on political strife, in 
spite of the fact that formal characteristics of war are not apparent, Zimbabwe and Nigeria are 
also included in the light of the magnitude of their internal strife. The two groups are related 
to terrorism in the perspective that political strife and civil conflicts harbor breeding grounds 
for the proliferation of terrorism.  
 Third, in the categorization of resource-wealthy countries, there are two main issues in 
the clustering of petroleum-exporting countries. (i) There are some countries which can 
qualify as wealthy in resources for only a small fraction of the sampled periodicity. This may 
be either due a decline in the production of resources or the recent discovery of reserves in oil. 
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(ii) Some countries which are not wealthy in the export of petroleum also reflect 
macroeconomic features that are similar to those of petroleum-exporting countries. A good 
example is Botswana which considerably depends on a mineral-intensive industry. We 
address this issue by exclusively selecting countries for which exports have been petroleum-
dominated for at least a decade of the sampled periodicity. A minimalist approach is adopted 
in this study in the perspective that we exclusively select petroleum-exporting nations that 
meet the underlying criterion, namely:  Angola, Algeria, Chad, Cameroon, Congo Republic, 
Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, Libya and Sudan. 
 Fourth, there are two motivations for the categorization of nations in terms wealth. (i) 
Wealthy or high income nations have been established to be associated with more resources 
needed to mitigate the negative   externalities of terrorism (Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2009). This 
is also consistent with a recent stream of literature on the use of foreign aid to mitigate the 
negative effects associated with terrorism (Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2017; Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2017c). The two narratives are connected in the perspective that foreign aid is 
disbursed by high-income countries to their low-income counterparts. (ii)  In Africa, income 
levels have been established to be exogenous to good governance (Asongu, 2012c), which is 
essential in the fight against terrorism. The classification of income-levels is consistent with 
the Financial Development and Structure Database of the World Bank. These include: low-, 
middle-, ‘lower middle’- and ‘upper middle’-income countries.  
 Fifth, regional classification is in terms of SSA and North Africa for a twofold reason. 
(i) For the most part, North African countries exclusively reflect Islam-dominated countries 
from which a significant cause of terrorism such as Islamic fundamentalism may be apparent. 
(ii) In accordance with Boyce and Ndikumana (2008), this distinction (which is consistent 
with the World Bank’s regional classification) provides room for more policy implications.  
 Sixth, contrary to landlocked nations, coastal countries may provide more avenues for 
terrorism by means of more networking and movement opportunities. Furthermore, countries 
that are closed from the sea have been documented to be associated with lower governance 
quality levels (Arvis et al., 2007) and by extension; political stability/non-violence (which is 
an aspect of political governance) could provide opportunities for political strife and civil 
wars that eventually provide a fertile ground for terrorism. Seventh, the classification of 
religious dominations is based on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Fact book 
(CIA, 2011). 
The definitions of fundamental features are disclosed in Appendix 4. Moreover, the 
statistical validity for the choice of fundamental characteristics on the one hand and 
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differences in terrorism dynamics within fundamental characteristics on the other hand, are 
provided in Appendix 5 and Appendix 6 respectively. In essence, the ‘difference in means’ 
tests which are overwhelmingly significant confirm the statistical validity of the choice of 
fundamental characteristics and distinction of terrorism dynamics within fundamental 
characteristics.  
It is worthwhile to articulate that some indicators of governance have figures that are 
above the standard range of between -2.5 to +2.5, namely: non principal component (PC)-
augmented variables and PC-augmented variables. Concerning the PC-augmented variables, 
depending on eigenvalues and proportion of variation pertaining to the derived PC, the 
corresponding PC composite indicators can display ranges that are higher than those reflected 
by their constituent elements. For instance, the -4.102 corresponding to economic governance 
is not an issue. Some non PC-augmented variables such as political stability in Sudan also 
have lower limits that are below -2.5. The few exceptions are close to the lower limit and 
limited to only three years of the sampled 17 years and do not significantly affect the findings. 
This justification for the scale of governance variables has been used in contemporary African 
governance literature (Asongu et al., 2019). 
 
3.2 Methodology 
 
3.2.1 Principal Component Analysis  
 The principal component analysis (PCA) technique is adopted to bundle variables for 
the conceptual relevance of some governance indicators. It is a statistical approach that is 
employed to reduce the dimensions of a set of highly correlated variables into smaller sets of 
indicators that are composite and uncorrelated (Tchamyou, 2017, 2018; Asongu  & 
Tchamyou, 2016; Mina, 2017). High degrees of substitution among governance variables that 
justify the approach are provided in Appendix 3. The criteria employed to retain common 
factors or principal components (PCs) are from Kaiser (1974) and Jolliffe (2002) who have 
recommended the selection of PCs with an eigenvalue greater than the mean or one.  
 As apparent in Table 1, the first PC denoting the composite indicator for political 
governance (Polgov) has an eigenvalue of 1.647 and a total variation of 82.3%. In the same 
vein: (i) economic governance (Ecogov) has an eigenvalue 1.863 and a total variation of 
93.1% while (ii) institutional governance (Instgov) has an eigenvalue of 1.867 with a total 
variation of 93.3%. Political governance which is the election and replacement of political 
leaders consists of voice & accountability and political stability/no violence. Economic 
governance is the formulation and implementation of policies that deliver public goods and is 
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composed of government effectiveness and regulation quality. Institutional governance which 
is represented by corruption-control and the rule of law, is the respect by citizens and the state 
of institutions that governance interactions between them. While the definitions are drawn 
from Kaufmann (2010), the bundling exercise that is needed to match the definitions with 
statistical validity is consistent with Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016a).  
 
Table 1: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for Governance  
Principal 
Components 
Component Matrix(Loadings) Proportion Cumulative 
Proportion 
Eigen 
Value 
 VA PS RQ GE RL CC    
          
First PC (Polgov) 0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.823 0.823 1.647 
Second PC -0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.176 1.000 0.352 
          
First PC (Ecogov) --- --- 0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.931 0.931 1.863 
Second PC --- --- -0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.068 1.000 0.137 
          
First PC (Instgov) --- --- --- --- 0.707 0.707 0.933 0.933 1.867 
Second PC --- --- --- --- -0.707 0.707 0.066 1.000 0.132 
          
P.C: Principal Component. VA: Voice & Accountability. RL: Rule of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. PS: 
Political Stability. CC: Control of Corruption. Polgov (Political Governance): First PC of VA & PS. Ecogov (Economic Governance): First 
PC of RQ & GE. Instgov (Institutional Governance): First PC of RL & CC.  
 
 
3.2.2 Methodology 
 
 Given that T>N in most sub-samples, the Fixed Effects (FE) estimator has better 
‘goodness of fit’ properties compared to dynamic estimation techniques such as the 
Generalised Method of Moments. The FE model is adopted in order to control for 
characteristics that are consistent with the research question being investigated, notably: 
country-specific features or the unobserved heterogeneity. Furthermore, it is relevant to note 
that, when a panel consists of observations on fixed and comparatively small sets of countries 
or cross section units (e.g. specific fundamental characteristics  or member states of a given 
region), there is a presumption in favour of FE (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2018). 
Eq. (1) below corresponds to the adopted FE process4.  
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4
 The inclusion of a lagged term for terrorism will make the modeling dynamic and the Fixed Effects method 
will be inappropriate for its estimation because of a potential correlation between the lagged terrorism indicator 
and the error term. Unfortunately, using a dynamic model like the Generalized Method of Moments would result 
in instrument proliferation because some fundamental characteristics have countries (N) that are smaller than the 
number of periods in the study (T). There are various causes of endogeneity. Some are the unobserved 
heterogeneity and simultaneity.  The adopted Fixed Effects regressions control for the unobserved 
heterogeneteity which is not accounted for by dynamic regressions such as Generalized Method of Moments. 
19 
 
where, tiT , , is a terrorism variable (domestic, transnational, unclear and total) of country i
 
at  
period t ;  tiG ,
 
is a governance indicator (political, economic or institutional governance); 
0 is a constant;
 
W  is the vector of control variables  (Internet, inclusive development, 
economic growth, inflation, and military expenditure),
 
i
 
is the country-specific effect, t
 
is 
the time-specific constant  and ti ,  the error term. The specifications are Heteroscedasticity 
and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) in standard errors. They are also carefully tailored to 
avoid potential issues of multicollinearity associated with governance indicators. In the 
presence of very high collinearity (as it is the case with the governance indicators), the 
variables with the high degree of substitution enter into conflict and only a few emerge from 
the regression output with the expected signs (Beck et al., 2003). Unexpected signs in the 
variables of interest obviously lead to misguided policy implications. Hence, the governance 
variables are employed in distinct specifications. Moreover, the governance variables are 
comparable because they are employed in different specifications with the same control 
variables (Andrés & Asongu, 2013; Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2016; Tchamyou et al., 2018). 
 
4. Empirical results   
 Tables 2, 3 and 4 respectively present findings corresponding to the relationships 
between terrorism dynamics and political governance, economic governance and institutional 
governance. Each table consists of three-sets of four specifications. Each of the four 
specifications uniquely corresponds to one terrorism variable. The first-two sets of 
specifications are related to the constituents of the composite indicator in the third-set.   
 In Table 5, the specifications are based on a decomposed full sample in order to 
articulate the fundamental characteristics for comparative purposes. Panel A, B, C and D 
respectively show results corresponding to domestic terrorism, transnational terrorism, 
unclear terrorism and total terrorism.  
 
4.1 Governance and terrorism  
 Regressions from the full sample provide baseline results which are informative and 
expositional for the comparative analysis. The following baseline findings can be established 
on the relationship between governance and terrorism in Tables 2-4. First, from the baseline 
results on political governance, the following are apparent. (i) Only voice and accountability 
significantly reduces unclear terrorism. (ii) Political stability consistently decreases the 
dynamics of terrorism with the following order of increasing negative magnitude: unclear 
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terrorism, transnational terrorism, domestic terrorism and total terrorism. (iii) Political 
governance also consistently decreases terrorism variables with the same order of increasing 
negative magnitude: unclear terrorism, transnational terrorism, domestic terrorism and total 
terrorism. 
 Second, from the perspective of economic governance, the following are established: 
(i) regulation quality has significant positive effects on domestic terrorism and total terrorism; 
(ii) government effectiveness has a significant negative effect on domestic terrorism whereas 
(iii) there is no significant effect from economic governance on any terrorism variable.    
 Third, concerning the relationship with institutional governance, the rule of law 
negatively affects unclear and total terrorisms whereas no significant effects are apparent 
from corruption-control and institutional governance. 
 The signs of two control variables are worth discussing. While the sign of internet 
penetration is consistent with our expectations, that of inclusive human development is 
unexpectedly positive. The positive effect of inclusive human development may be traceable 
to the narratives in the literature maintaining that the African elite and middle class are 
unsympathetic to policies of inclusive development because such policies reduce their vested 
gains (Poulton, 2014). Hence, because these elite depend on state resources and have 
preferences for specific markets, they are very likely to skillfully  hamper socio-economic 
transformations by employing internal (e.g. civil unrest/war) and  external (e.g. terrorism) 
tactics of violence in order to retain a tight grip on governing institutions (see Poulton, 2014; 
Resnick, 2015). This clarification is consistent with Rodrik’s (2015) skepticism of the role of 
the elite and middle class on governance transformations in the continent.  
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Table 2: Political Governance and terrorism  
             
 Dependent Variables: Terrorism Dynamics 
 
   
 Voice and Accountability Political Stability Political Governance 
    
 Domestic 
Terror  
Trans. 
Terror  
Unclear 
Terror 
Total  
Terror 
Domestic 
Terror  
Trans. 
Terror  
Unclear 
Terror 
Total  
Terror 
Domestic 
Terror  
Trans. 
Terror  
Unclear 
Terror 
Total  
Terror 
Constant  0.366** 0.107 -0.013 0.396** 0.215* 0.059 0.025 0.284** 0.435*** 0.247*** 0.091 0.564*** 
 (0.016) (0.255) (0.869) (0.012) (0.077) (0.434) (0.702) (0.025) (0.001) (0.001) (0.156) (0.000) 
Voice & Accountability -0.037 -0.142 -0.132* -0.151 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.821) (0.122) (0.091) (0.324)         
Political Stability --- --- --- --- -0.446*** -0.365*** -0.116** -0.549*** --- --- --- --- 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.025) (0.000)     
Political governance  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.287*** -0.276*** -0.119** -0.393*** 
         (0.001) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) 
Internet  0.018*** 0.004 0.002 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.002 0.001 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.003 0.002 0.015*** 
 (0.000) (0.175) (0.352) (0.001) (0.001) (0.423) (0.480) (0.006) (0.000) (0.288) (0.443) (0.003) 
Inclusive development 0.045*** 0.012* 0.021*** 0.053*** 0.041*** 0.008 0.019*** 0.047*** 0.044*** 0.011* 0.020*** 0.051*** 
 (0.000) (0.056) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.190) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.083) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth  -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.009 -0.004 -0.006 -0.007 -0.008 -0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.489) (0.260) (0.169) (0.339) (0.590) (0.265) (0.133) (0.377) (0.696) (0.403) (0.181) (0.508) 
Inflation -0.002** 0.0008 0.0007 -0.0008 -0.002*** 0.0004 0.0006 -0.001 -0.002*** 0.0005 0.0006 -0.001 
 (0.027) (0.192) (0.178) (0.459) (0.005) (0.464) (0.227) (0.176) (0.009) (0.416) (0.246) (0.223) 
Military Expenditure  0.009 0.014 0.018 0.023 -0.020 -0.009 0.011 -0.012 -0.006 -0.0006 0.012 0.002 
 (0.836) (0.628) (0.453) (0.620) (0.649) (0.726) (0.645) (0.795) (0.887) (0.983) (0.609) (0.953) 
             
R²(Within) 0.076 0.028 0.053 0.071 0.123 0.106 0.058 0.134 0.099 0.080 0.061 0.109 
Fisher 5.72*** 2.03* 3.95*** 5.34*** 9.78*** 8.30*** 4.33*** 10.76*** 7.69*** 6.09*** 4.56*** 8.52*** 
Countries  49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Observations  471 471 471 471 471 471 471 471 471 471 471 471 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Significant values are highlighted in bold. Trans: Transnational terror. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. FE: Fixed Effects.  The difference between the total 
number of observations from the regression output and the total number of observations based a uniform sample size is due to issues of missing observations. 
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Table 3: Economic Governance and terrorism   
  
 Dependent Variables: Terrorism Dynamics 
             
  Regulation Quality Government Effectiveness Economic Governance 
 Domestic 
Terror  
Trans. 
Terror  
Unclear 
Terror 
Total  
Terror 
Domestic 
Terror  
Trans. 
Terror  
Unclear 
Terror 
Total  
Terror 
Domestic 
Terror  
Trans. 
Terror  
Unclear 
Terror 
Total  
Terror 
Constant 0.547*** 0.277*** 0.071 0.659*** 0.210 0.150 0.021 0.350** 0.378*** 0.180** 0.086 0.474*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.359) (0.000) (0.162) (0.116) (0.974) (0.028) (0.004) (0.032) (0.229) (0.001) 
Regulation Quality   0.374** 0.185 0.005 0.385* --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.045) (0.123) (0.957) (0.054)         
Government Effectiveness --- --- --- --- -0.359* -0.095 -0.100 -0.294 --- --- --- --- 
     (0.062) (0.434) (0.337) (0.150)     
Economic  Governance  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.007 0.028 -0.029 0.030 
         (0.939) (0.655) (0.592) (0.777) 
Internet  0.017*** 0.003 0.002 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.004 0.002 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.004 0.002 0.016*** 
 (0.000) (0.234) (0.362) (0.003) (0.000) (0.206) (0.411) (0.002) (0.000) (0.178) (0.356) (0.001) 
Inclusive development 0.045*** 0.011* 0.020*** 0.052*** 0.047*** 0.012* 0.020*** 0.054*** 0.045*** 0.011* 0.020*** 0.052*** 
 (0.000) (0.071) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.061) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.076) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDPg growth  -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.011 -0.005 -0.007 -0.007 -0.009 -0.006 -0.008 -0.007 -0.010 
 (0.434) (0.171) (0.111) (0.253) (0.580) (0.212) (0.134) (0.341) (0.466) (0.176) (0.121) (0.270) 
Inflation -0.001* 0.001* 0.0008 -0.0003 -0.002** 0.0009 0.0008 -0.0007 -0.002** 0.0009 0.0007 -0.0006 
 (0.063) (0.097) (0.143) (0.732) (0.022) (0.164) (0.150) (0.468) (0.029) (0.142) (0.161) (0.532) 
Military Expenditure  0.031 0.025 0.019 0.047 -0.015 0.008 0.012 0.004 0.010 0.018 0.015 0.029 
 (0.496) (0.387) (0.441) (0.338) (0.745) (0.787) (0.634) (0.933) (0.822) (0.532) (0.561) (0.565) 
             
R²(Within) 0.084 0.028 0.047 0.077 0.083 0.024 0.049 0.073 0.076 0.023 0.048 0.069 
Fisher 6.43*** 2.03* 3.45*** 5.83*** 6.34*** 1.73 3.61*** 5.53*** 5.71*** 1.65 3.5*** 5.18*** 
Countries  49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Observations  471 471 471 471 471 471 471 471 471 471 471 471 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Significant values are highlighted in bold. Trans: Transnational terror. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. FE: Fixed Effects.  The difference between the total 
number of observations from the regression output and the total number of observations based a uniform sample size is due to issues of missing observations. 
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Table 4: Institutional Governance and terrorism  
  
 Dependent Variables: Terrorism Dynamics 
             
 Rule of Law Corruption-Control Institutional  Governance 
 Domestic 
Terror  
Trans. 
Terror  
Unclear 
Terror 
Total  
Terror 
Domestic 
Terror  
Trans. 
Terror  
Unclear 
Terror 
Total  
Terror 
Domestic 
Terror  
Trans. 
Terror  
Unclear 
Terror 
Total  
Terror 
Constant  0.234 0.101 -0.047 0.312* 0.470*** 0.220** 0.090 0.575*** 0.379*** 0.206** 0.084 0.494*** 
 (0.125) (0.295) (0.563) (0.053) (0.001) (0.012) (0.223) (0..000) (0.003) (0.010) (0.213) (0.000) 
Rule of Law   -0.299 -0.191 -0.236** -0.359* --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.121) (0.117) (0.024) (0.078)         
Corruption-Control --- --- --- --- 0.201 0.055 0.048 0.193 --- --- --- --- 
     (0.203) (0.583) (0.596) (0.249)     
Institutional  Governance  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.008 -0.022 -0.034 -0.008 
         (0.923) (0.693) (0.473) (0.931) 
Internet  0.018*** 0.004 0.002 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.004 0.002 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.004 0.002 0.016*** 
 (0.000) (0.180) (0.362) (0.001) (0.000) (0.161) (0.327) (0.001) (0.000) (0.189) (0.388) (0.002) 
Inclusive development 0.045*** 0.011* 0.020*** 0.052*** 0.043*** 0.011* 0.019*** 0.050*** 0.045*** 0.012* 0.020*** -0.052**** 
 (0.000) (0.068) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.087) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.066) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDPg growth  -0.005 -0.007 -0.007 -0.009 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.010 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.010 
 (0.532) (0.221) (0.147) (0.331) (0.440) (0.179) (0.107) (0.259) (0.465) (0.193) (0.121) (0.280) 
Inflation -0.002** 0.0008 0.0006 -0.0009 -0.002** 0.0009 0.0008 -0.0005 -0.002** 0.0008 0.0007 -0.0007 
 (0.018) (0.213) (0.221) (0.390) (0.043) (0.138) (0.124) (0.607) (0.030) (0.175) (0.172) (0.503) 
Military Expenditure  -0.007 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.018 0.017 0.021 0.033 0.010 0.012 0.015 0.023 
 (0.686) (0.902) (0.827) (0.939) (0.692) (0.557) (0.392) (0.498) (0.820) (0.677) (0.543) (0.629) 
             
R²(Within) 0.081 0.028 0.059 0.076 0.079 0.023 0.048 0.072 0.076 0.023 0.048 0.069 
Fisher 6.14*** 2.04* 4.35*** 5.72*** 6.00*** 1.67 3.50*** 5.40*** 5.71*** 1.65 3.54*** 5.16*** 
Countries  49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Observations  471 471 471 471 471 471 471 471 471 471 471 471 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Significant values are highlighted in bold. Trans: Transnational terror. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. FE: Fixed Effects. The difference between the total 
number of observations from the regression output and the total number of observations based a uniform sample size is due to issues of missing observations.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
Table 5: Summary of results  
                  
 
     
 Panel A: Domestic Terrorism  
 
     
 Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Religion  Africa 
 Low Mid LMid UMid English French Oil NOil Closed Open Conf NConf SSA NA Chrit Islam  
VA -0.266 0.498* 0.989*** -0.187*** -0.389 0.007 -0.838 0.010 -0.585*** 0.392* -0.240 -0.089 -0.160 0.057 -0.147 0.067 -0.037 
 (0.120) (0.076) (0.004) (0.001) (0.174) (0.947) (0.130) (0.942) (0.006) (0.051) (0.506) (0.552) (0.281) (0.899) (0.447) (0.774) (0.821) 
PS -0.413*** -0.597*** -0.479** -0.905*** -1.081*** -0.323*** -1.173*** -0.309*** -0.549*** -0.341** -0.133 -0.479*** -0.405*** -0.967*** -0.206* -0.807*** -0.446*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.041) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.015) (0.542) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.706) (0.000) (0.000) 
Polgov -0.327*** -0.261 0.087 -1.090*** -0.835*** -0.201** -1.612*** -0.176** -0.544*** -0.057 -0.149 -0.336*** -0.301*** -0.666** -0.162 -0.503*** -0.287*** 
 (0.001) (0.158) (0.720) (0.000) (0.001) (0.028) (0.001) (0.040) (0.000) (0.652) (0.448) (0.000) (0.001) (0.030) (0.116) (0.002) (0.001) 
RQ 0.397 0.506 1.287** 0.044 0.418 0.254 0.477 0.303 0.311 0.369 -0.135 0.268 0.210 -0.190 0.211 0.727* 0.374** 
 (0.108) (0.109) (0.017) (0.884) (0.227) (0.269) (0.330) (0.127) (0.314) (0.137) (0.759) (0.171) (0.285) (0.768) (0.317) (0.059) (0.045) 
GE -0.242 -0.569* -0.032 -1.185** -0.247 -0.619*** -1.739*** -0.243 -0.332 -0.280 0.187 -0.440** -0.305 -1.628** -0.163 -0.769** -0.359* 
 (0.341) (0.088) (0.945) (0.024) (0.537) (0.004) (0.005) (0.206) (0.242) (0.342) (0.673) (0.025) (0.122) (0.016) (0.471) (0.041) (0.062) 
Ecogov 0.050 -0.005 0.314 -0.187 0.104 -0.136 -0.325 0.110 -0.024 0.062 0.015 -0.054 -0.029 -0.568 0.020 -0.033 0.007 
 (0.700) (0.976) (0.231) (0.379) (0.626) (0.251) (0.360) (0.916) (0.872) (0.668) (0.945) (0.600) (0.773) (0.113) (0.856) (0.882) (0.939) 
RL -0.333 -0.273 0.499 -1.793*** -0.882** -0.334 -1.335** -1.273 -0.535* 0.082 0.195 -0.616*** -0.248 -1.243** -0.204 -0.511 -0.299 
 (0.183) (0.447) (0.299) (0.000) (0.047) (0.133) (0.040) (0.160) (0.075) (0.774) (0.676) (0.002) (0.217) (0.031) (0.376) (0.167) (0.121) 
CC 0.080 0.357 0.891*** -0.802 0.069 0.158 -1.135* 0.194 0.188 0.436* 0.350 0.030 0.137 -0.130 0.149 0.364 0.201 
 (0.690) (0.162) (0.007) (0.034) (0.829) (0.374) (0.067) (0.218) (0.399) (0.056) (0.320) (0.853) (0.393) (0.803) (0.404) (0.262) (0.203) 
Instigov -0.045 0.098 0.0455** -0.785*** -0.160 -0.011 -0.728** 0.013 -0.032 0.179 0.156 -0.134 -0.001 -0.362 0.015 0.005 0.008 
 (0.699) (0.518) (0.020) (0.000) (0.429) (0.910) (0.024) (0.881) (0.812) (0.160) (0.412) (0.146) (0.988) (0.204) (0.878) (0.976) (0.923) 
                  
                  
 Panel B: Transnational  Terrorism 
 
     
 Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Religion Africa 
 Low Mid LMid UMid English French Oil NOil Closed Open Conf NConf SSA NA Chrit Islam  
VA -0.315*** 0.231 0.556** -0.985** 0.048 -0.244** 0.012 -0.184** -0.434*** 0.072 -0.035 -0.219*** -0.150 -0.220 -0.317*** -0.015 -0.142 
 (0.001) (0.241) (0.020) (0.019) (0.760) (0.030) (0.979) (0.022) (0.001) (0.584) (0.914) (0.000) (0.112) (0.498) (0.003) (0.919) (0.122) 
PS -0.352*** -0.326*** -0.340** -0.302 -0.547*** -0.313*** -0.815*** -0.310*** -0.496*** -0.226** -0.307 -0.362*** -0.362*** -0.507** -0.200*** -0.536*** -0.365*** 
 (0.000) (0.009) (0.036) (0.181) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.120) (0.000) (0.000) (0.023) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Polgov -0.308*** -0.160 -0.006 -0.454** -0.282*** -0.272*** -0.888*** -0.254*** -0.460*** -0.111 -0.195 -0.310*** -0.272*** -0.463** -0.206*** -0.364*** -0.276*** 
 (0.000) (0.218) (0.967) (0.034) (0.018) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.181) (0.273) (0.000) (0.000) (0.034) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
RQ 0.450 0.171 0.450 -0.029 0.185** -0.067 0.385 0.092 -0.050 0.204 0.217 0.026 0.218 -0.292 0.133 0.190 0.185 
 (0.233) (0.435) (0.233) (0.897) (0.036) (0.672) (0.341) (0.413) (0.786) (0.209) (0.597) (0.808) (0.081) (0.524) (0.257) (0.457) (0.123) 
GE -0.095 -0.190 0.177 -0.698 -0.215 -0.203 -0.931* 0.001 -0.138 -0.127 0.384 -0.188 -0.003 -0.886 0.066 -0.401 -0.095 
 (0.488) (0.415) (0.579) (0.079) (0.380) (0.172) (0.076) (0.986) (0.415) (0.506) (0.341) (0.083) (0.976) (0.069) (0.599) (0.109) (0.434) 
Ecogov -0.010 -0.0006 0.178 -0.139 0.110 -0.089 -0.099 0.026 -0.053 0.042 0.173 -0.051 0.064 -0.375 0.059 -0.086 0.028 
 (0.883) (0.996) (0.325) (0.380) (0.345) (0.276) (0.735) (0.640) (0.519) (0.660) (0.399) (0.375) (0.326) (0.144) (0.341) (0.560) (0.655) 
RL -0.489*** 0.113 0.497 -0.572 0.122 -0.520*** -0.217 -0.289*** -0.634*** -0.058 0.176 -0.395*** -0.134 -0.650 -0.239** -0.215 -0.191 
 (0.000) (0.653) (0.134) (0.122) (0.615) (0.001) (0.689) (0.009) (0.000) (0.755) (0.679) (0.000) (0.294) (0.118) (0.062) (0.381) (0.117) 
CC -0.103 0.250 0.425* 0.075 0.333* -0.092 0.429 -0.061 -0.030 0.137 0.368 -0.085 0.050 -0.105 -0.040 0.350 0.055 
 (0.358) (0.162) (0.067) (0.795) (0.057) (0.447) (0.406) (0.495) (0.822) (0.358) (0.251) (0.347) (0.626) (0.778) (0.682) (0.102) (0.583) 
Instigov -0.151** 0.125 0.263* -0.102 0.183* -0.141** 0.083 -0.087* -0.152* 0.063 0.159 -0.126** -0.010 -0.203 -0.064 0.074 -0.022 
 (0.016) (0.235) (0.052) (0.563) (0.095) (0.036) (0.758) (0.083) (0.061) (0.447) (0.358) (0.013) (0.862) (0.321) (0.252) (0.532) (0.693) 
                  
                  
 Panel C: Unclear Terrorism 
 
     
 Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Religion Africa 
 Low Mid LMid UMid English French Oil NOil Closed Open Conf NConf SSA NA Chrit Islam  
VA -0.225*** 0.111 0.335** -0.755 -0.045 -0.199** -0.135 -0.145** -0.382*** 0.076 -0.299 -0.141* -0.124 -0.454** -0.231** -0.022 -0.132* 
 (0.004) (0.525) (0.026) (0.236) (0.788) (0.016) (0.732) (0.040) (0.000) (0.502) (0.193) (0.080) (0.123) (0.049) (0.024) (0.862) (0.091) 
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PS -0.061 -0.250** -0.085 -0.774** -0.449*** -0.060 -0.478** -0.040 -0.075 -0.127 -0.087 -0.097* -0.079 -0.454*** -0.071 -0.183* -0.116** 
 (0.242) (0.025) (0.403) (0.020) (0.002) (0.232) (0.018) (0.405) (0.258) (0.110) (0.534) (0.072) (0.129) (0.004) (0.248) (0.061) (0.025) 
Polgov -0.011** -0.150 0.090 -0.720** -0.281** -0.098** -0.576** -0.074* -0.173*** -0.048 -0.138 -0.113** -0.090* -0.532*** -0.106* -0.132 -0.119** 
 (0.016) (0.194) (0.396) (0.024) (0.031) (0.034) (0.019) (0.081) (0.004) (0.503) (0.271) (0.023) (0.057) (0.000) (0.053) (0.151) (0.012) 
RQ -0.061 0.193 0.633*** -0.065 0.217 -0.106 0.083 -0.034 -0.099 0.081 -0.143 -0.034 -0.051 -0.430 -0.071 0.223 0.005 
 (0.592) (0.327) (0.007) (0.849) (0.291) (0.363) (0.810) (0.727) (0.517) (0.562) (0.611) (0.744) (0.630) (0.191) (0.524) (0.295) (0.957) 
GE -0.113 0.031 0.373* 0.011 0.240 -0.218** -0.658 -0.059 -0.206 0.112 0.098 -0.143 -0.051 -0.493 -0.037 -0.133 -0.100 
 (0.333) (0.947) (0.062) (0.985) (0.371) (0.046) (0.144) (0.537) (0.142) (0.501) (0.729) (0.178) (0.633) (0.163) (0.754) (0.523) (0.337) 
Ecogov -0.053 0.071 0.295*** -0.032 0.150 -0.105* -0.179 -0.028 -0.095 0.062 -0.012 -0.055 -0.030 -0.302 -0.032 0.029 -0.029 
 (0.378) (0.520) (0.009) (0.891) (0.234) (0.079) (0.476) (0.575) (0.212) (0.452) (0.930) (0.321) (0.578) (0.102) (0.586) (0.809) (0.592) 
RL -0.215* -0.206 0.383* -1.483*** -0.173 -0.284** -0.562 -0.215** -0.254* -0.097 -0.218 -0.304*** -0.197* -0.547* -0.277** -0.104 -0.236** 
 (0.016) (0.356) (0.065) (0.006) (0.513) (0.011) (0.225) (0.026) (0.087) (0.549) (0.466) (0.004) (0.071) (0.067) (0.024) (0.611) (0.024) 
CC -0.075 0.251 0.332** 0.217 0.251 -0.049 -0.255 0.034 -0.008 0.211 -0.209 0.087 0.024 -0.103 -0.012 0.212 0.048 
 (0.429) (0.115) (0.022) (0.613) (0.189) (0.584) (0.565) (0.663) (0.936) (0.104) (0.353) (0.323) (0.781) (0.701) (0.895) (0.237) (0.596) 
Instigov -0.077 0.066 0.205** -0.254 0.080 -0.076 -0.233 -0.034 -0.059 0.057 -0.111 -0.038 -0.033 -0.176 -0.061 0.051 -0.034 
 (0.146) (0.484) (0.016) (0.332) (0.504) (0.123) (0.315) (0.436) (0.379) (0.426) (0.360) (0.437) (0.498) (0.231) (0.255) (0.604) (0.473) 
                  
                  
 Panel D: Total Terrorism 
 
     
 Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Religion Africa 
 Low Mid LMid UMid English French Oil NOil Closed Open Conf NConf SSA NA Chrit Islam  
VA -0.484*** 0.520* 1.066*** -1.818*** -0.350 -0.165 -0.605 -0.129 -0.842*** 0.338 -0.197 -0.216 -0.267* -0.059 -0.348* -0.011 -0.151 
 (0.000) (0.073) (0.003) (0.001) (0.218) (0.363) (0.271) (0.405) (0.000) (0.106) (0.632) (0.175) (0.094) (0.901) (0.097) (0.961) (0.324) 
PS -0.563*** -0.584*** -0.499** -0.789** -1.085*** -0.429*** -1.239*** -0.433*** -0.737*** -0.349** -0.224 -0.599*** -0.516*** -1.042*** -0.301** -0.893*** -0.549*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.039) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.367) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.017) (0.000) (0.000) 
Polgov -0.486*** -0.241 0.107 -0.996*** -0.814*** -0.321*** -1.593*** -0.297*** -0.749*** -0.083 -0.191 -0.459*** -0.405*** -0.773** -0.275** -0.599*** -0.393*** 
 (0.000) (0.207) (0.671) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.529) (0.392) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) 
RQ 0.295 0.498 1.226** 0.041 0.478 0.150 0.653 0.252 0.132 0.383 0.167 0.182 0.269 -0.216 0.213 0.633* 0.385* 
 (0.268) (0.127) (0.028) (0.895) (0.163) (0.554) (0.176) (0.243) (0.690) (0.138) (0.740) (0.380) (0.202) (0.750) (0.354) (0.098) (0.054) 
GE -0.249 -0.523 0.023 -1.172** -0.225 -0.598** -1.742 -0.158 -0.415 -0.221 0.477 -0.434 -0.186 -1.912*** -0.071 -0.844** -0.294 
 (0.364) (0.123) (0.961) (0.031) (0.614) (0.012) (0.005) (0.449) (0.184) (0.470) (0.345) (0.038) (0.380) (0.007) (0.773) (0.024) (0.150) 
Ecogov 0.016 0.003 0.318 -0.186 0.142 -0.159 -0.224 0.022 -0.099 0.084 0.187 -0.079 0.024 -0.665* 0.046 -0.096 0.030 
 (0.906) (0.984) (0.239) (0.398) (0.500) (0.225) (0.524) (0.837) (0.556) (0.579) (0.467) (0.473) (0.825) (0.077) (0.704) (0.663) (0.777) 
RL -0.596** -0.228 0.606 -1.847*** -0.852* -0.544** -0.991 -0.397* -0.813** 0.029 0.351 -0.728*** -0.300 -1.326** -0.350* -0.562 -0.359* 
 (0.027) (0.538) (0.221) (0.000) (0.052) (0.027) (0.125) (0.060) (0.013) (0.921) (0.511) (0.000) (0.164) (0.029) (0.163) (0.125) (0.078) 
CC -0.008 0.406 0.931*** -0.620 0.171 0.106 -0.778 0.154 0.152 0.393* 0.387 0.025 0.161 -0.341 0.104 0.193 0.104 
 (0.970) (0.124) (0.007) (0.117) (0.591) (0.589) (0.207) (0.368) (0.535) (0.098) (0.336) (0.885) (0.350) (0.535) (0.592) (0.249) (0.592) 
Instigov -0.139 0.126 0.491** -0.716*** -0.105 -0.073 -0.519 -0.029 -0.109 0.152 0.196 -0.163* -0.003 -0.459 -0.031 0.020 -0.008 
 (0.266) (0.418) (0.015) (0.002) (0.598) (0.501) (0.107) (0.763) (0.467) (0.252) (0.365) (0.097) (0.972) (0.125) (0.775) (0.909) (0.931) 
                  
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Significant values are highlighted in bold. Low: Low Income countries. Mid: Middle Income countries. LMid: Lower Middle Income countries. UMid: 
Upper Middle Income countries. English: English Common law countries. French: French Civil law countries. Oil: Petroleum Exporting countries. NOil: Non-petroleum Exporting countries. Closed:  Landlocked 
countries. Open: Countries open to the sea. Conf: Conflict Affected countries. NConf: Countries not Affected by Conflicts. SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. NA: North Africa. Chrit: Christian dominated countries. Islam: 
Muslim dominated countries. VA: Voice & Accountability. PS: Political Stability. Polgov: Political Governance. RQ: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. Ecogov: Economic Governance. RL: Rule of 
Law. CC: Corruption-Control. Instigov: Institutional Governance. Control variables used in Tables 2-4 are included in the estimation of results reported in Table 5. They are not disclosed because of space constraint. 
The control variables, information criteria and observations are available upon request. 
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4.2 Comparative economics of governance in terrorism 
 
 The following comparative findings are established for domestic terrorism. (i) Voice 
and accountability significantly increases (decreases) terrorism middle-income, low-middle 
income and coastal countries (upper-middle income and landlocked countries). (ii) With the 
exception of conflict-affected countries, political stability consistently decreases terrorism, 
with the following order of increasing negative magnitude: Christian-dominated, resource-
poor, French civil law, coastal, sub-Saharan African, low-income, African, conflict-free, 
lower-middle income, landlocked, middle-income, Islam-dominated, upper-middle income, 
North African, English common law and resource-rich countries. (iii) While, the effect of 
political governance is insignificant in middle-income, lower-middle income, coastal, 
conflict-affected and Christian-dominated countries, the following negative effects are 
established in increasing order of negative magnitude: resource-poor, French civil law, 
African, SSA, low-income, conflict-free, Islam-dominated, landlocked, North Africa, English 
common law, upper middle income and resource-rich countries. (iv) Positive effects are 
apparent from regulation quality in lower-middle income, Islam-dominated and African 
countries. (v) The following significant results are observed from governance effectiveness, in 
increasing order of negative magnitude: African, conflict-free, middle-income, French civil 
law, Islam-dominated, upper-middle income, North African and resource-rich countries. (vi) 
There are no significant estimates from economic governance regressions. (vii) Significant 
negative effects from the rule of law are established in landlocked, conflict-free, English 
common law, North African, resource-rich and upper-middle income countries (in increasing 
negative magnitude).  (viii)  Corruption-control has a positive (negative) in lower middle 
income and coastal (resource-rich) countries. (ix) Institutional governance has a positive 
(negative) effect in lower middle income (upper middle income and resource-rich) countries.  
We observe the following comparative findings for transnational terrorism. (i) Voice 
and accountability is positive on lower middle income countries and negative with an 
increasing order of negative magnitude in the following features: resource-poor, conflict-free, 
French civil law, Christian-dominated, low-income, landlocked and upper middle income 
countries. (ii) With the exceptions of upper middle income and conflict-affected countries, 
political stability negatively affects transnational terrorism in the following order of 
increasing negative magnitude: Christian-dominated, coastal, resource-poor, French civil-law, 
middle income, lower-middle income, low income, conflict-free, SSA, African, landlocked, 
North African, Islam-dominated, English common law and resource-rich countries. (iii) But 
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for middle-income,  lower middle income, coastal and conflict-affected countries, the 
negative effect is apparent in the following features with increasing negative magnitude: 
Christian-dominated and resource-poor, French civil law, SSA, African, English common 
law, low income, conflict-free, Islam-dominated, upper middle income, landlocked, North 
African and resource-rich countries. (iv) Regulation quality (government effectiveness) is 
exclusively positively (negatively) significant in English common law (resource-rich) 
countries while the incidence of economic governance is consistently insignificant. (v) The 
effect of the rule of law is negatively significant in some features with the following order of 
increasing negative magnitude: Christian-dominated, resource-poor, conflict-free, low-
income, French civil law and landlocked countries. (vi) Corruption-control is positively 
significant in English common law and lower middle income countries. (vii) Whereas 
institutional governance also positively influences English common law and lower middle 
income countries, the following show negative effects with increasing negative magnitude: 
resource-poor, conflict-free, French civil law, low income and landlocked countries.  
The following comparative findings are established for unclear terrorism (i) Voice and 
accountability is positive in lower middle income countries but negative with the following 
increasing order of negative magnitude in a significant number of fundamental features: 
African, conflict-free, resource-poor, French civil law,  low-income, Christian-dominated, 
landlocked and North African countries. (ii) Otherwise stated, all are negatively significant in 
increasing order of negative magnitude. Political stability: conflict-free, African, Islam-
dominated, middle-income, English common law, North African, resource-rich and upper 
middle income countries. (iii)Political governance: low-income,  resource-poor, SSA, French 
civil law, Christian-dominated, conflict-free, African, landlocked, English common law, 
North African, resource-rich and upper middle income countries. (iv) Regulation quality, 
corruption-control and institutional governance are exclusively positively significant in upper 
middle income countries whereas government effectiveness and economic governance are 
positively (negatively) significant in lower middle income (French civil law) countries. (v) 
While the rule of law is positive in middle income countries, it is negative in other 
fundamental features:  SSA, resource-poor, low-income, African, landlocked, Christian-
dominated, French civil law, conflict-free, North African and upper middle income countries. 
 
The following comparative findings are established for total terrorism (i) Voice and 
accountability is positive in middle income and lower middle income countries but negative in 
the following features: SSA, Christian-dominated, low-income, landlocked and upper middle 
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income countries. (ii) Political stability, with the exception of conflict-affected countries 
where the effect is not significant, negative effects are apparent in: Christian-dominated, 
coastal, French civil law, resource-poor, lower middle income, SSA, African, low income, 
middle income, conflict-free, landlocked, upper-middle income, Islam-dominated, North 
Africa, English common law and resource-rich countries. (iii) Political governance: Christian-
dominated, resource-poor, French civil law, African, SSA, conflict-free, low-income, Islam-
dominated, landlocked, North African, English common law, upper-middle-income and 
resource-rich countries. (iv) Regulation quality is positively significant in lower middle 
income, Islam-dominated and African countries. (v) Government effectiveness has negative 
effects in the following features: French civil law, Islam-dominated, upper middle income and 
North African countries. (vii) Economic governance (Corruption-control) is exclusively 
negatively (positively) significant in North African (lower middle income and coastal) 
countries whereas institutional governance is positive in lower middle income countries but 
negative in conflict-free and upper middle income countries. 
 
 
4.3 Further discussing of results 
 
 Some of the findings are expected, others are not while some are conflicting. The 
conflicting tendency builds on the fact that the edge of governance in fighting terrorism may 
not be consistent across terrorism and governance dynamics. In what follows, the established 
findings are discussed in more depth. 
 First, the projected dominance of higher income countries compared to their lower 
income counterparts, in the ability to fight terrorism through governance channels, is not 
consistently apparent. This finding indirectly raises the concern about whether higher income 
countries in Africa are necessarily associated with higher levels of governance. It is important 
to note that we do not expect assumptions underpinning the distinction of countries by income 
levels to be 100% accurate, which is the reason an empirical exercise is needed to either 
validate or reject them. 
 Second, the dominance of English common law countries vis-à-vis their French civil 
law counterparts is confirmed for the most part. Exceptions to this tendency may be traceable 
to mainstream criticisms of some of the hypotheses underpinning the distinction of nations in 
terms of legal origins. The following criticisms have been documented on the distinction of 
countries in terms of legal origins (Deakin & Siems 2010; Fowowe, 2014; Asongu, 2015). (i) 
Doubts have been expressed in scholarly circles on the statistical fragility of distinguishing 
29 
 
countries in the contemporary era based on historical information. (ii) With the advent of 
globalisation and internationalization, distinctions in comparative development on the basis of 
legal origins are less persuasive. (iii) The stratification of countries by means of Common law 
versus Civil law does not account for inter alia: the influence of transplant law as well as the 
post-transplant period on the one hand and on the other hand, mixtures when foreign laws 
were being adopted by former colonies.  
 Third, the overwhelming dominance of resource-rich countries is consistent with 
expectations. However, the few exceptions should be seen in the light of the fact that 
petroleum-wealth could also be directly associated with terrorists attacks if the fruits of 
petroleum exports are not evenly distributed across the population. This is the case of the 
Niger Delta in Nigeria. Moreover, some countries in the world that have acknowledged 
scarcity in natural resources have focused more on improving governance standards and 
preventing civil conflict through consensus-building  (America, 2013; Amavilah, 2015). 
Rwanda and Mauritius are some examples in Africa. 
 Fourth, the assumption underpinning the institutional cost associated with 
landlockedness and by extension, less effective use of governance mechanisms to fight 
terrorism, does not withstand empirical scrutiny. This leads to two main inferences. On the 
one hand, governance standards in landlocked countries may not be significantly lower 
compared to their coastal counterparts. On the other hand, given that landlocked countries in 
Africa substantially rely on the seaports of neighboring countries (and road traffic) for the 
import of  heavy equipment and other material needed for the implementation of sound 
governance standards, the time wasted and associated institutional cost (from land transport) 
do not significantly deter their capacities to fight terrorism. Such insignificance may be 
apparent when air transport is used for emergency cases and sea transport (via neighboring 
countries) used for preventive measures.  
 Fifth, the findings based on conflict-affected countries against their non-affected 
counterparts are the most consistent. This is essentially because the ability of countries not 
affected by conflicts to use governance mechanisms in the fight against terrorism is 
significantly higher.  In essence, politically-stable countries are likely to provide a more 
enabling environment for governance and economic development (Asongu, 2018). This 
narrative is consistent with Beegle et al. (2016, p.10), who have argued that; state fragility is 
significantly linked with less development. By extension, terrorism may also be a product of 
less effective governance and economic development. This is essentially because civil wars, 
political strife and state fragility diminish suitable conditions for inter alia: (i) the election and 
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replacement of political leaders (i.e. political governance); (ii) the formulation and 
implementation of policies that deliver public commodities (i.e. economic governance) and 
(iii) the respect of citizens and the State of institutions that govern interactions between them 
(i.e.  institutional governance).  
 Sixth, the comparative edge of North African countries in relation to their counterparts 
south of the Sahara is consistent with the findings pertaining to political instability and 
conflicts in the preceding paragraph. Accordingly, the relative inability of SSA countries 
builds on the fact that violence and political instability have been associated with the sub-
region. As summarized by Asongu (2014c):  “seven of the nine cases of total chaos and 
societal breakdowns known in recent history have been registered in Africa (with the 
exceptions of Afghanistan and Syria): Angola, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Zaire/Congo, 
Somalia, and Sudan” (p.1569). 
 Seventh, in the light of the narrative in the preceding paragraph, while the relative 
importance of Islam-dominated countries may build on the relevance of North Africa (which 
is  exclusively Islam-dominated countries), the underpinnings associating Christianity with 
the protestant ethnic (and by extension higher levels of governance and more  effective battle 
against terrorism) does not withstand empirical scrutiny. Accordingly, the Protestant ethnic 
which is more associated with Christianity-dominated countries may also be linked to more 
avenues of civil unrests and strikes. Consistent with Weber (2002) (first published in 1930), 
the Protestant ethic influences citizens to adopt attitudes that are contrary to mainstream 
thinking and by extension, also deviate from established societal norms. In weak democracies, 
such protestant ethic could weaken instead of consolidate governance standards.  
 
 
5. Concluding implication, caveats and further research directions 
 
 We set-out to assess the comparative economics of governance in fighting terrorism in 
53 African countries for period 1996-2012. Four terrorism variables are used, namely: 
domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism dynamics. Nine bundled and unbundled 
governance variables are employed, notably: political stability/no violence, voice & 
accountability, political governance, government effectiveness, regulation quality, economic 
governance, corruption-control, the rule of law and institutional governance. The empirical 
evidence is based on Fixed Effects regressions. In the analytical procedure, we have first 
bundled governance indicators by means of principal component analysis before engaging the 
empirical exercise with the full sample. In the final step, specifications are based on a 
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decomposed full sample in order to articulate the fundamental characteristics for comparative 
purposes.  
The following broad findings have been established. First, good governance is an 
appealing tool in fighting terrorism. Second, the relevance of the good governance dynamics 
is as follows in order of increasing relevance: economic governance, institutional governance 
and political governance. The findings are presented in increasing order of magnitude to 
emphasise fundamental features in which governance dynamics have the highest effect in 
mitigating terrorism.   
A caveat to this study is that, state-sponsored terrorism is not considered in the 
conception and definition of terrorism. This is essentially because terrorism is defined as  “the 
actual or threatened use of force by sub-national actors with the purpose of employing 
intimidation to meet political objectives”. This definition therefore does not take on board 
state-sponsored terrorism. The failure to incorporate this dimension of terrorism complicates 
the measurement and analysis of the governance-terrorism nexus covered in this study. 
Unfortunately, addressing this caveat is beyond the scope of this research because of data 
availability constraints. Accordingly to the best of our knowledge, data on state-sponsored 
terrorism is not available.  
Future studies would improve the extant literature by investigating what policy 
variables can interact with inclusive human development to reduce terrorism. Moreover, 
assessing the how political governance is relevant in mitigating terrorism throughout the 
conditional distributions of terrorism is also worthwhile for two main reasons. On the one 
hand, it is overwhelmingly significant across fundamental characteristics. On the other hand, 
its effectiveness may be contingent on initial levels of terrorism. Quantile regressions can be 
used to assess the underlying relationships throughout the conditional distributions of 
terrorism. Furthermore, random effects (also known as mixed effects or multi-level models) 
could be considered when variables show less variability as apparent in Appendix 4. Insights 
into how such random effects models can be taken on board are available in Gelman and Hill 
(2006) and Allison (2009).  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Definitions of variables  
Variables  Signs Definitions of variables (Measurements) Sources 
    
 
Political Stability  
 
PS 
“Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as the 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional and violent means, 
including domestic violence and terrorism”  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
    
Voice & 
Accountability  
VA “Voice and accountability (estimate): measures the extent to which a 
country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their 
government and to enjoy freedom of expression, freedom of 
association and a free media”.  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
    
Political 
Governance  
Polgov First Principal Component of Political Stability and Voice & 
Accountability. The process by which those in authority are  
selected and replaced. 
           PCA 
    
 
Government 
Effectiveness 
 
GE 
“Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the quality of 
public services, the quality and degree of independence from 
political pressures of the civil service, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of governments’ 
commitments to such policies”.  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
    
Regulation  Quality  RQ “Regulation quality (estimate): measured as the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector development”.  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
    
Economic 
Governance  
Ecogov “First Principal Component of Government Effectiveness and 
Regulation Quality. The capacity of government to formulate & 
implement policies, and to deliver services”.  
              PCA 
    
 
Rule of Law  
 
RL 
“Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society and in 
particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence”.  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
    
 
Corruption-Control  
 
CC 
“Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions of the extent 
to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both 
petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state 
by elites and private interests”.  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
    
Institutional 
Governance  
Instgov First Principal Component of Rule of Law and Corruption-Control. 
The respect for citizens and the state of institutions  
that govern the interactions among them 
PCA 
    
Domestic terrorism Domter Number of Domestic terrorism incidents (in Ln)  
 
Ender et al. (2011) 
and 
Gailbulloev et al. 
(2012) 
 
   
Transnational 
terrorism  
Tranter Number of Transnational terrorism incidents (in Ln) 
   
Uuclear terrorism  Unclter Number of terrorism incidents whose category in unclear (in Ln) 
   
Total terrorism  Totter Total number of terrorism incidents (in Ln) 
    
Internet   Internet Internet penetration (per 100 people) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Inclusive 
development    
IHDI Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index  UNDP 
    
Growth   GDPg Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Inflation   Inflation Consumer Price Index (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Military Expense    Milit Military Expenditure  (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators. WGI: World Bank Governance Indicators.    PCA: Principal Component Analysis. 
UNDP: United Nations Development Program. Ln: Natural logarithm.  
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Appendix 2: Summary statistics (1996-2012) 
      
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations 
      
Political Stability -0.550 0.948 -3.220 1.188 742 
Voice & Accountability  -0.681 0.732 -2.233 1.026 742 
Political Governance  0.000 1.283 -3.420 2.770 742 
Government Effectiveness  -0.727 0.628 -2.454 0.951 740 
Regulation Quality  -0.699 0.643 -2.668 0.983 742 
Economic Governance  0.0002 1.365 -4.102 3.739 740 
Rule of Law -0.710 0.666 -2.670 1.055 742 
Control of Corruption  -0.601 0.591 -2.057 1.249 741 
Institutional Governance -0.002 1.364 -3.656 3.676 741 
Domestic terrorism  0.414 0.892 0.000 6.234 901 
Transnational terrorism 0.221 0.541 0.000 3.332 901 
Unclear terrorism 0.097 0.389 0.000 4.888 901 
Total terrorism 0.540 1.002 0.000 6.300 901 
Internet penetration  4.243 7.773 0.000 55.416 874 
Inclusive development  0.912 4.448 0.127 45.325 687 
GDP growth  5.080 9.317 -62.075 149.973 875 
Inflation   16.586 150.256 -9.797 4145.108 803 
Military Expenditure  2.278 3.034 0.145 39.606 722 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation.   
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Appendix 3: Correlation analysis (uniform sample size: 471) 
                   
Political governance  Economic governance  Institutional governance  Control variables  Terrorism variables   
PS VA Polgov GE RQ Ecogov CC RL Instgov Internet IHDI GDPg Inflation Milit Domter Tranter Unclter Totter  
1.000 0.640 0.906 0.654 0.640 0.670 0.707 0.773 0.765 0.205 0.028 0.005 -0.191 -0.238 -0.492 -0.492 -0.265 -0.554 PS 
 1.000 0.904 0.677 0.727 0.725 0.679 0.736 0.731 0.183 0.190 0.004 -0.113 -0.292 -0.212 -0.257 -0.078 -0.256 VA 
  1.000 0.735 0.754 0.770 0.765 0.833 0.826 0.214 0.120 0.005 -0.168 -0.292 -0.389 -0.414 -0.190 -0.448 Polgov 
   1.000 0.865 0.969 0.860 0.895 0.908 0.383 0.223 0.023 -0.139 -0.131 -0.175 -0.228 -0.068 -0.211 GE 
    1.000 0.962 0.781 0.856 0.847 0.329 0.175 -0.019 -0.188 -0.177 -0.152 -0.211 -0.053 -0.195 RQ 
     1.000 0.852 0.908 0.910 0.370 0.207 0.003 -0.168 -0.158 -0.170 -0.228 -0.063 -0.211 Ecogov 
      1.000 0.867 0.967 0.275 0.200 -0.025 -0.158 -0.081 -0.216 -0.277 -0.104 -0.268 CC 
       1.000 0.965 0.354 0.119 -0.007 -0.159 -0.153 -0.256 -0.283 -0.133 -0.301 RL 
        1.000 0.324 0.166 -0.017 -0.164 -0.120 -0.244 -0.290 -0.123 -0.294 Instgov 
         1.000 0.002 -0.053 -0.057 -0.067 0.076 0.025 0.041 0.053 Internet 
          1.000 -0.045 -0.011 -0.026 0.142 0.036 0.174 0.149 IHDI 
           1.000 -0.143 -0.101 -0.010 0.003 -0.072 -0.016 GDPg 
            1.000 -0.081 0.006 0.146 0.087 0.068 Inflation 
             1.000 0.141 0.081 0.081 0.155 Milit 
              1.000 0.580 0.625 0.957 Domter 
               1.000 0.461 0.743 Tranter 
                1.000 0.664 Unclter 
                 1.000 Totter 
                   
PS: Political Stability/Non violence. VA: Voice & Accountability. Polgov: Political Governance. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: Regulation Quality. Ecogov: Economic Governance. CC: Corruption-Control. RL: 
Rule of Law. Instgov: Institutional Governance. Internet: Internet Penetration. IHDI: Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index. GDPg: Gross Domestic Product Growth. Milit: Military Expenditure. Domter: 
Domestic Terrorism. Tranter: Transnational Terrorism. Unclter: Unclear Terrorism. Totter: Total Terrorism.   
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Appendix 4: Categorization of Countries 
Categories  Panels Countries Num 
    
 
 
Income 
levels 
   
Middle 
Income  
Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Lesotho, Libya, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, 
Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, 
Tunisia.  
   22 
   
 
Low Income  
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo 
Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, The Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tanzania, Togo, 
Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.  
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Legal 
Origins  
English 
Common-law 
Botswana, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
    20 
   
 
French Civil-
law  
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia. 
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Regions  
 
 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, 
Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, Seychelles, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
 
   47 
   
North Africa  Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania,   Morocco, Tunisia. 6 
    
Religion  Christianity  Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African 
Republic, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial 
Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, 
Seychelles, South Africa, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe.  
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Islam  Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, The Gambia, Guinea, 
Guinea Bissau, Libya , Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia,  
20 
    
 
Resources  
Petroleum 
Exporting 
Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Congo Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, 
Libya, Nigeria, Sudan.  
10 
   
 
Non-
Petroleum 
Exporting  
 Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, 
Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic,  Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Egypt, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania,  Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, 
Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe.  
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Stability  
Conflict  Angola, Burundi, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo Democratic Republic, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Zimbabwe.  
  12 
   
 
 
Non-Conflict  
Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso,  Cameroon, Cape Verde, Comoros,  
Congo Republic, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Lesotho, Libya,  Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, 
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Senegal, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia. 
    
 
Openness to 
Sea 
Landlocked  Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
15 
   
 
Not 
landlocked 
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Comoros, Congo Democratic 
Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, 
Eritrea, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Liberia, 
Libya,  Madagascar, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan,  Sao Tomé & Principe, Seychelles, 
South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia. 
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Num: Number of cross sections (countries) 
 
 
 
Appendix 5: Differences in means of fundamental characteristics  
         
Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Religion   
Low Mid LMid UMid English Frenc
h 
Oil NOil Closed Open Conf NConf SSA NA Chrit Islam  
na (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.362) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.385) (0.000) Low 
 na (0.000) (0.000) (0.362) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.381) Mid 
  na (0.341) (0000) (0.000) (0.232) (0.000) (0.163) (0.000) (1.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) LMid 
   na (0.000) (0.000) (1.000) (0.000) (0.095) (0.000) (0.341) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000 (0.000) UMid 
    na (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (1.000) English 
     na (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (1.000) (0.000) French 
      na (0.000) (0.019) (0.000) (0.232) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) Oil 
       na (0.000) (0.019) (0.000) (0.232) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) NOil 
        na (0.000) (0.124) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.031) Closed 
         na (0.000) (0.124) (0.000) (0.000) (0.031) (0.000) Open 
          na (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) Conf 
           na (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) NConf 
            na (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) SSA 
             na (0.000) (0.000) NA 
              na (0.000) Chrit 
               na Islam 
                 
Low: Low Income countries. Mid: Middle Income countries. LMid: Lower Middle Income countries. UMid: Upper Middle Income countries. English: English 
Common law countries. French: French Civil law countries. Oil: Petroleum Exporting countries. NoOil: Non-petroleum Exporting countries. Closed:  
Landlocked countries. Open: Countries open to the sea. Conf: Conflict Affected countries. NoConf: Countries not Affected by Conflicts. SSA: Sub-Saharan 
Africa. NA: North Africa. Chrit: Christian dominated countries. Islam: Muslim dominated countries. Null Hypothesis: Difference in means =0. P-values in 
brackets. Bold values represent significant differences in means at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels.  
 
Appendix 6: Differences in means of fundamental characteristics in terrorism dynamics  
         
Panel A: Domestic Terrorism   
        
Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Religion   
Low Mid LMid UMid English French Oil NOil Closed Open Conf NConf SSA NA Chrit Islam  
na (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.723) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.216) (0.000) (0.139) (0.000) (0.000) (0.803) (0.002) Low 
 na (0.000) (0.000) (0.723) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.216) (0.000) (0.139) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.803) Mid 
  na (0.001) (0.055) (0.000) (0.140) (0.000) (0.438) (0.000) (0.432) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) LMid 
   na (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.696) (0.000) (0.000) UMid 
    na (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.258) (0.000) (0.205) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.597) English 
     na (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.258) (0.000) (0.205) (0.000) (0.000) (0.597) (0.000) French 
      na (0.000) (0.000) (0.052) (0.017) (0.000) (0.000) (0.030) (0.000) (0.000) Oil 
       na (0.000) (0.052) (0.000) (0.017) (0.030) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) NOil 
        na (0.000) (0.904) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.149) Closed 
         na (0.000) (0.904) (0.000) (0.000) (0.149) (0.000) Open 
          na (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.079) Conf 
           na (0.000) (0.000) (0.079) (0.000) NConf 
            na (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) SSA 
             na (0.000) (0.000) NA 
              na (0.031) Chrit 
               na Islam 
                 
Panel B: Transnational Terrorism   
                 
Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Religion   
Low Mid LMid UMid English French Oil NOil Closed Open Conf NConf SSA NA Chrit Islam  
na (0.047) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.250) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.234) (0.001) (0.702) (0.000) (0.000) (0.437) (0.061) Low 
 na (0.003) (0.000) (0.250) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.243) (0.000) (0.702) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.061) (0.437) Mid 
  na (0.000) (0.895) (0.000) (0.195) (0.000) (0.908) (0.000) (0.329) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.024) LMid 
   na (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) UMid 
    na (0.000) (0.226) (0.000) (0.782) (0.000) (0.356) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.080) English 
     na (0.000) (0.226) (0.000) (0.782) (0.000) (0.356) (0.007) (0.000) (0.080) (0.000) French 
      na (0.000) (0.380) (0.000) (0.018) (0.000) (0.000) (0.057) (0.000) (0.000) Oil 
       na (0.000) (0.380) (0.000) (0.018) (0.057) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) NOil 
        na (0.000) (0.295) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.062) Closed 
         na (0.000) (0.295) (0.014) (0.000) (0.062) (0.000) Open 
          na (0.011) (0.000) (0.011) (0.011)  (0.303) Conf 
           na (0.001) (0.000) (0.303) (0.011) NConf 
            na (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) SSA 
             na (0.000) (0.000) NA 
              na (0.283) Chrit 
               na Islam 
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Panel C: Unclear Terrorism   
Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Religion   
Low Mid LMid UMid English French Oil NOil Closed Open Conf NConf SSA NA Chrit Islam  
na (0.069) (0.001) (0.000) (0.057) (0.519) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.495) (0.002) (0.496) (0.000) (0.000) (0.567) (0.068) Low 
 na (0.001) (0.000) (0.519) (0.057) (0.000) (0.000) (0.497) (0.000) (0.496) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.068) (0.567) Mid 
  na (0.047) (0.025) (0.000) (0.109) (0.000) (0.459) (0.000) (0.222) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.001) (0.008) LMid 
   na (0.000) (0.000) (0.227) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.765) (0.000) (0.000) UMid 
    na (0.368) (0.000) (0.000) (0.140) (0.007) (0.131) (0.022) (0.000) (0.000) (0.117) (0.882) English 
     na (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.140) (0.022) (0.131) (0.000) (0.000) (0.882) (0.117) French 
      na (0.000) (0.085) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.134) (0.000) (0.000) Oil 
       na (0.000) (0.085) (0.000) (0.006) (0.134) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) NOil 
        na (0.002) (0.874) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.250) Closed 
         na (0.000) (0.874) (0.003) (0.000) (0.250) (0.000) Open 
          na (0.005) (0.000) (0.002) (0.007) (0.252) Conf 
           na (0.002) (0.000) (0.252) (0.007) NConf 
            na (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) SSA 
             na (0.000) (0.000) NA 
              na (0.260) Chrit 
               na Islam 
                 
Panel D: Total Terrorism   
Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Religion   
Low Mid LMid UMid English French Oil NOil Closed Open Conf NConf SSA NA Chrit Islam  
na (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.736) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.139) (0.000) (0.065) (0.000) (0.000) (0.811) (0.001) Low 
 na (0.000) (0.000) (0.736) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.139) (0.000) (0.065) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.811) Mid 
  na (0.001) (0.032) (0.000) (0.116) (0.000) (0.454) (0.000) (0.530) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) LMid 
   na (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.591) (0.000) (0.000) UMid 
    na (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.157) (0.000) (0.089) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.620) English 
     na (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.157) (0.000) (0.089) (0.000) (0.000) (0.620) (0.000) French 
      na (0.000) (0.023) (0.000) (0.023) (0.000) (0.000) (0.076) (0.000) (0.000) Oil 
       na (0.000) (0.046) (0.000) (0.023) (0.076) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) NOil 
        na (0.000) (0.814) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.090) Closed 
         na (0.000) (0.814) (0.000) (0.000) (0.090) (0.000) Open 
          na (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.034) Conf 
           na (0.001) (0.000) (0.034) (0.000) NConf 
            na (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) SSA 
             na (0.000) (0.000) NA 
              na (0.018) Chrit 
               na Islam 
                 
Low: Low Income countries. Mid: Middle Income countries. LMid: Lower Middle Income countries. UMid: Upper Middle Income countries. English: English 
Common law countries. French: French Civil law countries. Oil: Petroleum Exporting countries. NoOil: Non-petroleum Exporting countries. Closed:  
Landlocked countries. Open: Countries open to the sea. Conf: Conflict Affected countries. NoConf: Countries not Affected by Conflicts. SSA: Sub-Saharan 
Africa. NA: North Africa. Chrit: Christian dominated countries. Islam: Muslim dominated countries. Null Hypothesis: Difference in means =0. P-values in 
brackets. Bold values represent significant differences in means at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. 
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